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Abstract 
This paper explores the effects of savings account ownership on remittances and payment 
services in Sub-Saharan Africa through the lens of a field experiment executed in Central 
Malawi.  Remittances are a major form of financial support for SSA and Sub-Saharan Africans. 
Through the use of a cross section analysis I find a positive significant relationship between 
account ownership and the likelihood to send and receive a remittance.  Specifically, I find 
account ownership can increase the likelihood of sending a remittance by 8.75 times and increase 
the likelihood of receiving a remittance by 10.18 times.  
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Introduction 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is a rapidly growing region and is home to just over one billion 
people, making it one of the largest regions in the world.  However,  SSA is also one of the most 
impoverished and financially excluded regions of the world. Thus, questions regarding ways to 
improve financial well being in the region are very critical to SSA’s development.  Given the 
lack of development within the region, one major way money flows into the region is through 
remittances.  Remittances are any payments sent back to families from migrants who have left 
their communities.  Remittances have been proven in many studies to be beneficial to SSA by 
way of alleviating poverty, improving democratic institutions and education, as well as 
improving subjective well being.  In this thesis, I will explore the effects of increased savings 
accounts on remittances sent and received in the region through the exploration of a 2010 field 
experiment in Malawi. 
SSA is one of the least banked populations in the world, with around 60% of the 
population still unbanked to this day, making it underbanked relative to both developed and 
underdeveloped regions of the world .  As of 2014, 25.6% of the SSA population has any bank 1
account versus 94% in advanced economies and 40% in non advanced economies .  With only 2
4.5 physical banks per 100,000 adults, SSA trails every other region in the world including the 
Middle East & North Africa .  This lack of bank presence in the region leads to SSA being a very 3
cash-heavy economy. Given this striking disparity, the literature related to banking in the region 
is growing and provides insight as to the benefits of increased banking and financial inclusivity 
in the region.  
1 World Bank, 2018 
2 As compared to 93.6% in the U.S and 77.7% in Europe and Central Asia, World Bank Global Findex Data 2018 
3 World Bank, 2020 
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Although banking is not very prevalent in the region, access to money is still necessary 
for the people that live in the region to buy goods and services and to invest in their businesses. 
One of the major ways money is moved in and out of SSA is by way of remittances. 
Remittances are monies sent in and out of communities from family or friends.  Typically, 
remittances flow from migrants that have left SSA communities back into the communities they 
have left. Remittances, as I will discuss later in my literature review, have been proven to have a 
positive impact on SSA on the micro and macro level.  For example, Williams (2017) finds that 
remittances have a positive impact on democratic institutions in SSA by improving schooling 
and reducing poverty.  While Sambo (2017) finds that increased remittances lead to less 
undernourishment. Remittances are a relatively easy way to increase development and financial 
well-being in a country because they do not rely on governments as much as they rely on the 
strength of community members’ familial relationships.  
My focus in this paper will be answering the question: What are the effects of savings 
account ownership on remittances and payment services in Sub-Saharan Africa? I isolate savings 
account uptake as a catalyst for remittances and test the effects of increased savings accounts on 
remittances and payment services used within Malawi. Using a Two Stage Least Squares 
analysis, I find that having a formal savings account increases a household’s likelihood to send 
or receive remittances. Specifically, I find that there is a statistically significant relationship 
between having a savings account and the likelihood that a household receives and sends a 
remittance. This finding implies that if banking solutions are more widely available in the region, 
more remittances will likely flow to and from the region leading to benefits on micro and macro 
factors such as poverty and health of democratic institutions. I also analyze the relationship 
 
3 
between savings account uptake and use of payment services, where households in the data 
receive income and salaries. However, I find no significant relationship within the sample 
between savings account uptake and the use of payment services.  
The data I use are taken from a field experiment which took place in central Malawi, a 
country that is generally in line with the poorer economies of Sub-Saharan Africa.  Malawi is 
a very under-resourced  country, with a per capita GDP of  $389.40 in 2018 versus the SSA 
average of $1,585.77.  Poverty is also much higher in Malawi, as 70.3% of Malawians live 
on less than $1.90 a day versus the SSA average of 42.3%.  However, Malawi has a slightly 
less undernourished population (17.5%) relative to the Sub-Saharan Average (21.35%). 
Under nourishment figures were found by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations and they represent the prevalence of severe food insecurity.  Malawi is fairly 
average as it relates to life expectancy at 63.28 years, 2.4 years above the SSA average .  4
Literature Review 
In my analysis, I study savings account uptake as a catalyst for stimulating remittances and 
payment services within Central Malawi.  There are a number of studies that explore topics 
related to formal account uptake in SSA and other underdeveloped regions. For example Dupas 
et. al (2014) provides insight as to the supply and demand factors that are responsible for the low 
rate of financial inclusion in SSA. There are also a large number of studies that study the effects 
of remittances in SSA.  For example, Akobeng (2016) finds that poverty levels are lessened on 
the macro level when remittances increase in SSA. There are not as many studies that explore the 
4 World Bank, 2020 
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intersection between formal account uptake and remittances.  My analysis will fill that gap and 
provide insight as to the positive effect that formal savings accounts can have on remittances. 
Flory (2018) and Flory (Forthcoming) both leverage the same field experiment as I do in 
my analysis.  Flory (Forthcoming) provides background to my analysis by proving the 
effectiveness of the field experiment’s information treatment in spurring savings account uptake 
and by exploring what demographic factors lead to higher rates of savings account adoption. 
Flory (Forthcoming) finds impact heterogeneities between savings account uptake and education 
level, remoteness of village, and gender of household head.  This finding is crucial to my 
analysis because I use remoteness of village and education levels as restrictions within the 
regressions given the information treatment was more effective in more remote and more 
educated households.  Flory (Forthcoming) also finds evidence of soft barriers against account 
uptake in the form of low levels of trust for banks and low level of information about banking 
services. This leads to the effectiveness of the information treatment because it allows 
information to flow to the more remote villages and also provides a friendly trustworthy face that 
softens the trust barrier.  
Flory (2018) finds a relationship between increased savings account and crop investment, 
a sign that increasing savings accounts can stimulate the local economies in SSA.  Flory (2018) 
also finds a relationship between increased savings account uptake and transfer payments to 
other households during the “hungry” season. This is similar to my analysis given transfer 
payments and remittances are similar.  Both are methods of providing a helping hand to relatives 
or friends.  Remittances are different from transfer payments in the sense that remittances come 
from family members outside of the immediate community that a household lives in.  
 
5 
 Remittances have been found, in multiple studies, to be shown to have a positive effect 
on poverty, political institutions, and well being metrics in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Sambo (2017), 
using data from 35 Sub-Saharan African countries from 2001-2011, finds that increased 
remittances into the region reduce the amount of undernourishment on the macro level, with the 
effects being more pronounced in intermediate income deciles than lower and higher income 
deciles.  Within the study, undernourishment is measured by the undernourishment index of the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the U.N.  This FAO index represents the 
probability that randomly selected individuals within an area consume less than a minimum 
calories requirement for a healthy life.  The study provides evidence that remittances can be 
useful in the fight against undernourishment in SSA, a major problem in the region. 
Akobeng (2016) uses World Bank data from 41 Sub-Saharan African countries to find 
that, on the macro level, remittances have a significant positive effect on poverty and inequality. 
Remittances are critical in the development of Sub-Saharan Africa as increased remittances have 
a beneficial effect on poverty in the region.  Poverty is a major problem in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and Malawi, as 42.3% (2015) and 70.3% (2016) of the respective populations are impoverished 
as measured by the poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day .  An important point in Akobeng, 5
2016 is the finding that financial development augments the effects of remittances on poverty 
and inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Those areas with increased financial development receive 
increased alleviation of poverty from remittances because of increased credit utilization and 
formal investment.  Williams (2016) finds that remittances have a positive effect on financial 
development, measured by improved utilization of private credit and formal financial 
5 World Bank, 2016 
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institutions. This means that remittances can increase financial development which can in turn 
augment the effects of future remittances into the region.  
Beyond objective measures that can oftentimes be removed from the state of people on 
the ground, Sulemana et al. (2019) find that remittances have a positive effect on subjective 
wellbeing in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Within the study, subjective wellbeing was measured by 
surveys being given to over 50,000 Sub-Saharan Africans.  The surveys asked the question: “In 
general, how would you describe: Your own present living conditions?” Responses were 
measured on a 1-5 scale and ranged from 1 for very bad to 5 for very good.  When treating 
remittances as an indicator variable measuring whether or not a household received any 
remittance, Sulemana et. al (2019) find that respondents reported 0.2945-0.2969 higher 
subjective wellbeing, on the scale of 5. This change represents a roughly 5.9% improvement of 
subjective wellbeing. These subjective wellbeing measures are important because they reflect the 
added value of receiving a remittance that is harder to quantify with most nominal economic 
data.  
Increased remittances have very positive effects on the macro well being of SSA 
countries as well, namely the health and efficiencies of SSA democratic institutions.  The health, 
integrity, and success of Sub-Saharan democratic institutions has been an issue for the region 
since colonizing powers left the region in the mid 20th century. Williams (2017) uses a panel of 
45 SSA countries over 1975-2014 to ascertain that remittances improve democratic institutions 
in the region by increasing schooling and reducing poverty.  However, Williams (2016) finds 
that Sub-Saharan democratic institutions in the region are not effectively mediating the effects of 
remittances on financial development, given the governments in place are not properly 
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incentivizing formal investment in the region. Structural improvements and improved 
efficiencies in democratic institutions can lead to better legislation regarding financial 
development which can then better mediate the positive economic effects of remittances. 
Given the documented positive effects that remittances have on Sub-Saharan Africa on 
the individual and macro level, my analysis will establish that increased savings accounts can 
help generate increased remittance activity to take advantage of remittances’ positive effects on 
SSA economies and political institutions.  
The only study that I am aware of that establishes a relationship between bank account 
uptake and remittance behavior is Chin, Wilcox, and Karkoviata (2010).  They find that Mexican 
immigrants to the U.S allocate funds sent back to Mexico in a different fashion after obtaining a 
bank account depending on the level of autonomy those immigrants have over their remittance 
allocations decisions.  My analysis will present the impact of increased bank account uptake in 
Central Malawi on remittances and payment services in the region.  
My analysis is most similar to Aga and Peria (2014), as they use World Bank survey data 
from five Sub-Saharan countries to find that increased remittances increase the probability that a 
household will open a formal bank account.  I will establish a relationship of the inverse: that 
increased formal bank accounts lead to increased remittances. However if true, Aga and Peria 
(2014) implies that my OLS regressions will likely be endogenous because of a reverse causal 
effect of remittances on bank account uptake.  My analysis leverages the experiment’s 
information treatment to remove endogeneities associated with increased account uptake and 
increased remittances.  
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Empirical Analysis:  
This thesis utilizes a cross section analysis of data collected in 2010 at the end of a two year 
experiment conducted in Malawi.  
Data & Methodology:  
I leverage a field experiment that took place in Central Malawi in the period from 2007-2010. 
The baseline data were collected from February-April 2008 and the second batch of data were 
collected during the same months in 2010. In 2007, A mobile bus-bank was created in Malawi to 
give more remote households in Central Malawi access to banking services. This “mobile bank 
on wheels” drove out to around 325 villages,  covering 2,052 households.  The mobile bank 
offered rural Malawians access to savings accounts that featured negative real but positive 
nominal interest rates.  The data were collected before and after an “information intervention”.  
Although there was blanket promotion for the bus-bank throughout the region, an 
information intervention was implemented on half of the sample and consisted of a bank 
representative coming to the communities to explain the procedures, benefits, fees and general 
information of the bus-bank.  This representative was put in place to break the soft barriers of 
trust and information by way of having a relationship with the community members and serving 
as a friendly/familiar face that represents the bank.  The 2008 questionnaire results indicate that 
9.60% of households had a member who had any formal savings account, while that number 
increased to 11.41% in the 2010 sampling, or a 18.9% increase from 2008 to 2010. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Demographic)  
Demographic Characteristics Sample Mean(Std. Dev.) Coefficient (std errors) on Treatment Dummy Observations 
Household Size, 2008 5.103 
(1.970) 
0.178** 
(0.0871) 
2,051 
Food Secure, 2008 0.082 
(0.274) 
0.0141 
(0.0121) 
2,051 
Number of Household 
Members Who Are Salaried, 
2008 
0.172 
(0.425) 
0.0183 
(0.0188) 
2,051 
  
Number of Household 
Members Who Are Literate in 
Chichewa, 2008 
2.196 
(1.636) 
0.245*** 
(0.0721) 
2,051 
Number of Household 
Members Who Are Literate in 
English, 2008 
0.918 
(1.233) 
0.254*** 
(0.0542) 
2,051 
Household Member Literate 
in English, 2008 
0.303 
(0.460) 
0.0481** 
(0.0203) 
2,051 
Total Crop Income, 2008 
(Kwacha) 
33,542.81 
(65864.87) 
4,250 
(4,132) 
2,051 
Total Value of Assets, 2008 1107.229 
(2771.168) 
149.8 
(137.7) 
1,622 
Someone in Household Has a 
Cellphone, 2008 
0.140 
(0.347) 
0.0327 
(0.0307) 
2,051 
Household Grows Tobacco 
(Cash Crop), 2008 
0.167 
(0.373) 
-0.0296 
(0.0481) 
1,622 
Distance from Nearest Bank 
Stop (km) 
7.906 
(3.349) 
-0.0850 
(0.148) 
2,051 
Any Formal Savings Account, 
2008 
0.0960 
(0.295) 
0.0418*** 
(0.0130) 
2,052 
Attrition 0.166 
(0.372) 
0.00599 
(0.0165) 
2,051 
 
 
 
 
10 
Table 1 displays demographic characteristics of the sample.  The average distance from a 
household to the nearest bank stop was about 8 kilometers. The average household size (5.103) is 
typical of an SSA household which are, on average, larger than those of the United States or 
Europe .  In regards to education: 30.3% of household heads were literate in English, while 6
households had, on average, 2.196 members who were literate in Chichewa, a Bantu language 
prominent in Malawi and other Southern African countries such as Zambia and Mozambique. 
Food security was poor in the sample as less than 10% of households were identified as being 
food secure. From a financial perspective: the average net worth (total value of assets) of the 
households within the sample is roughly $13.89  (1,944.15 Kwacha).  Roughly 26% of the 
households grow Malawi’s cash crop, tobacco. In 2008, 9.60% of households had a member with 
a formal savings account compared to 11.41% in 2010 after the information intervention.  The 
information intervention caused a greater increase in savings uptake in the treated group, as the 
control group saw a 0.56 percentage point rise in account uptake versus a 3.20 percentage point 
rise for the treated group.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 The average household size in the U.S is 2.6, per U.N Department of Economics and Social Affairs 
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Table 2: Remittance and Payment Characteristics 
 Payment Characteristics Sample Mean(Std. Dev.) Observations Median (Non-zero)* Observations (Non-zero)* 
Amount of Remittance 
Received (Kwacha) 
1285.526 
(10525.54) 
1,996 4,750 
 
186 
Quantity of Remittance 
Received 
0.252 
(1.390) 
1,996 1 186 
Any Remittance Received 0.093 
(0.291) 
1,996   
International Remittance 
Received 
0.012 
(0.106) 
1,996   
Formal Bank Remittance 
Received 
0.015 
(0.116) 
1,993   
Non-Bank Remittance 
Received 
0.077 
(0.266) 
1,993   
Amount of Remittance 
Sent (Kwacha) 
642.900 
(11252.84) 
1,962 2,000 95 
Quantity of Remittance 
Sent 
0.126 
(1.356) 
1,962 1 95 
Any Remittance Sent 0.048 
(0.215) 
1,962   
Formal Bank Remittance 
Sent 
0.006 
(0.076) 
1,878   
Non-Bank Remittance Sent 0.044 
(0.205) 
1,953   
Any Remittance Sent or 
Received 
0.128 
(0.334) 
2,017   
Total Amount of 
Remittances Sent and 
Received (Kwacha) 
1454.229 
(16,480.42) 
1,941 4,000 183 
Total Quantity of 
Remittances Sent and 
Received 
0.259 
(1.705) 
1,941 1 183 
Amount of Payment 
Services Used (Kwacha) 
11888.94 
(74842.98) 
1,978 39,000 271 
Quantity of Payment 
Services Transactions 
0.376 
(3.423) 
1,978 1 271 
Any Payment Service 
Transaction 
0.139 
(0.346) 
1,978   
Any Transaction 0.237 
(0.426) 
2,052   
Total Amount of 
Transactions (Kwacha) 
11106.84 
(69,793) 
1,933 20,000 369 
Total Quantity of 
Transactions 
0.531 
(3.565)  
1,941 
  
1 369 
  
*(Non-Zero) represents restricting the data to non-zero remittances or payment services 
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Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics for remittances and payment services 
throughout the sample.  As seen in Table 2, 23.7% of the sample made any remittance or 
payment services transaction, while 12.8% sent or received a remittance.  Of those that did send 
or receive a remittance, the average remittance received was 13,795.21 Kwacha ($98.54) and the 
average remittance sent was 13,277.58 Kwacha ($94.84).  Given there were a few very large 
remittances sent and received, the medians are also useful to note.  The median of non-zero 
remittances sent is 2000 Kwacha ($14.29) while the median of non-zero remittances received is 
4,750 Kwacha ($33.93). Remittances can serve as a lifeline from international relatives or 
support for relatives that live in other countries.  Of remittances received, 12.54% were from an 
international relative. Remittances were largely received as cash (60.50%) while only 21% of 
remittances were received via a direct deposit to a bank.  This high use of cash is typical in many 
SSA economies, as bank presence is low.  
Variables  
The questionnaire given to the households featured over 200 questions, ranging from the 
material of a household’s floor to credit utilization.  However, the variables I focus on fall into 
four main categories: remittance sent, remittances received,  payment services used (usually 
accepting income), and savings account uptake.  The first three categories make up the outcome 
variables of the regressions, while savings account uptake is used as the regressor in the 
regressions. Certain demographic characteristics are used as controls in the regression models. I 
control for income, wealth and household size.  Controls are needed to help limit endogeneity 
related to wealth given household wealth plays a big role in a household’s capacity to send 
remittances and the amount they receive in payment services transactions.  
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Within remittances sent, I analyze the effects of account ownership on frequency and 
monetary value of remittances sent as well as an indicator representing if any remittance was 
sent from a given household. Remittances sent serve as a lifeline from the households in the 
sample to a relative outside of the community yet in the country, for the large part.  Of the 248 
remittances sent, only two of them went to a relative who lives outside of Malawi.  Given 
households within the sample are typically poorer, remittances sent are found to be smaller, on 
average, than remittances received. The average remittance sent was 10255.04 Kwacha ($73.25), 
however this includes a very large remittance of 230,000 Kwacha ($1,642.86). The median 
remittance sent of the sample was only 2000 Kwacha ($14.29). 
I also analyze the effects of formal savings account ownership on frequency and 
monetary value of remittances received by households as well as an indicator representing if any 
remittance was received. The receiving of remittances serves a very different purpose than the 
sending of remittances. Those who receive remittances are receiving money from relatives to 
help support themselves or their businesses.  Immigrants who have left the sampling region 
typically have access to higher paying jobs in more developed regions of SSA or the world 
which allows them the capacity to send money back to their relatives. Receiving remittances is 
also a more international phenomenon than sending remittances. While the large part of 
remittances received were still from Malawi, 12.54% of remittances received were sent from 
outside of Malawi. The average remittance received was 9196.81 Kwacha ($65.69) and the 
median was 4500 Kwacha ($32.14), over double the median of remittances sent.  
Lastly, I analyze the effects of savings account ownership on frequency and monetary 
value of payment services used by each household, as well as an indicator representing if any 
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payment service was used by a household. The payment services used in the sample were mostly 
used to receive crop income at the auction house.  Of the payment services used, 83.95% were 
direct deposits received from an auction house payment, 7.10% were salary received as a direct 
deposit, 4.01% were the payment of utility bills, and 4.94% were “other”. The large part of 
payment service transactions were tobacco growers receiving crop income at the auction house. 
The mean of all payment services transactions was 73259.59 Kwacha ($523.28) and the median 
was 36000 Kwacha ($257.14).  The mean of auction house payments was 76254.91 Kwacha 
($544.68), the mean of salary deposits was 116613.26 ($832.95) and the mean of utility 
payments was 9123.08 Kwacha ($65.16). 
My main regressor of interest is an indicator variable representing whether or not any 
individual within a household had a formal savings account as of 2010.  
Endogeneity 
Endogeneity is likely present within the data because of omitted variable bias and reverse 
causality.   Possible omitted variables can include: wealth and income factors, level of education, 
cost of account, proximity to banking services and level of trust for institutions such as banks .  I 7
control for some of these variables in my analysis, but did not for others. Wealth is a major factor 
in whether a household has the capacity to send a remittance or receive higher amounts of 
auction house payments.  Wealth is also positively correlated with savings account status, so a 
regression of remittances sent on savings accounts may be biased upward because both 
remittances sent and savings account uptake rise with wealth.  Higher wealth also decreases a 
household’s need for receiving remittances. I use education as a restriction of the data, thus I do 
7 Osei-Assibey, Eric. ​Financial Exclusion: What Drives Supply and Demand For Basic Financial Services 
in Ghana? Savings and Development, Centre for Socio-economic Dynamics and Cooperation of the 
University of Bergamo 
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not control for education levels.  However, education is likely a cause for endogeneity as higher 
levels of education: correlate with higher formal account levels as well as increase the effect of 
the information treatment.  Cost of account could not be controlled for because there were not 
varying levels of interest rates offered in the products provided by the bus bank. The cost of an 
account likely has an effect on the likelihood someone will take up an account.  Another upward 
bias issue can come from payment services relationship with the indicator for whether a 
household grows tobacco.  Over 80% of payment service transactions were auction house 
payments where tobacco growers accepted payments for their crops.  A regression involving 
payment services and savings accounts will be biased by the fact that tobacco growing is more 
relevant to payment service use than savings account ownership status. However, I control for 
whether or not a household grows tobacco in order to remove this form of endogeneity.  
A household’s proximity to the nearest banking solution is also likely to have an effect on 
whether or not they take up an account.  The farther they are: the more of a hassle it is to get to a 
bank and the less information they likely have about the bank. I do not control for distance in my 
regression models, but I do restrict the sample to those farther than 1 kilometer away from the 
nearest stop as less information, outside of the treatment, will flow to the more remote areas. 
Trust for banks is a variable that is controlled for by way of the information treatment by 
providing a trustworthy familiar face to represent the bank and provide information. However, it 
is hard to perfectly measure and control for this soft barrier.  
Reverse causality is another issue within the sample that may drive endogeneity. As 
shown by Aga and Peria (2014), increased remittances can actually drive increased savings 
accounts.  This relationship could lead to endogeneity and an upward bias in the regression 
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results.  If increasing remittances actually increases savings account ownership then both will 
rise together, but the relationship will be driven by increased remittances not by increased 
savings accounts.  
Regression Models: 
Both Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two Stage Least Squares (IV-2SLS) regression models 
are used to examine the significance of the effect of savings uptake on remittance and payment 
service behavior.  First, an OLS regression model is used to estimate the raw effects of savings 
uptake on remittances and payment services.  However as discussed above, these estimates are 
likely biased due to multiple sources of endogeneity.  Next, a reduced form regression is used. 
The reduced form regression regresses the outcome variables on the information treatment in 
order to isolate endogeneity.  Further, I use the information treatment as an instrument in a 
IV-2SLS regression to gauge the effects (less endogeneity) of savings uptake on outcome 
variables. Cluster-robust standard errors are used, clustering at the village-cluster level. 
This process is repeated for remittances received, remittances sent, and finally payment 
service transactions.  Each table presents the regressions in an uncontrolled and controlled form. 
To control for income and household size I use demographic characteristics such as: food 
security, income measures, and household size.  
The models were all restricted to a subset of the data: those households that were greater 
than 1 kilometer from the nearest bus-bank stop and those households with a person that is 
literate in English.  The logic behind restricting the data as such is that this subset of the data 
takes greater advantage of the information assignment, as can be seen from an analysis of the 
impacts of the information intervention on savings uptake in Table 3.  
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Table 3: Effect of Information Treatment when Restricted by Literacy and Distance 
  
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) 
AnyInd, Restricted to 
Distance>1km 
(3) 
AnyInd, Restricted to 
Literate Member 
(4) 
AnyInd, Restricted to 
Non-Literate 
(5) 
AnyInd, Restricted by 
Distance & Literate Member AnyInd 
Information 
Treatment 
0.0682*** 
(0.0212) 
0.0743*** 
(0.0211) 
0.138*** 
(0.0411) 
0.0267** 
(0.0131) 
0.168*** 
(0.0420) 
Constant 0.0817*** 
(0.0120) 
0.0730*** 
(0.0112) 
0.156*** 
(0.0258) 
0.0529*** 
(0.00886) 
0.128*** 
(0.0246)   
Observations 2,051 1,958 622 1,428 557 
R-squared 0.011 0.014 0.027 0.003 0.041 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
In Table 3, AnyInd represents whether any household member has a formal bank account 
and literacy was measured by whether or not a household member was literate in English. 
Table 3 shows OLS regressions of the information treatment on individual savings 
account uptake.  As the data are restricted by literacy and distance the effect of the information 
treatment grows.  The data show that, on average, 8.17% of households in the control group have 
a member who has an individual savings account. This same figure grows to 15% for those 
households that received the information treatment.  This represents a 6.82 percentage point 
increase which equates to a 83.48% rise in account ownership attributed to the information 
treatment.  When restricting the data by literacy, the information treatment’s effect is augmented 
even more, as there is a 13.8 percentage point increase in savings accounts for households with a 
literate member, or an 88% increase.  When restricted by distance, the information treatment 
group sees a 7.43 percentage point increase over the control group, which amounts to a 101.8% 
increase.  When the data are restricted by both distance and literacy the effect of the information 
treatment is a 16.8 percentage point increase or a 131.3% rise in individual account uptake.  
 
18 
As Table 3 shows, the information treatment has a significant effect on account uptake. 
Given the information treatment was a random assignment, it can be used as an instrument to 
remove endogeneity from the first OLS regressions.  
The regression models are listed below.  The first two models regress the outcome 
variables on ‘Any Formal Savings Account’, restricted to those households that are farther than 1 
kilometer from the nearest bank stop and households with an English literate member.  The first 
model features no controls while the second model controls for factors such as wealth and 
household size. Models 1 and 2 are estimated in Tables 4, 5, and 6.  
Model 1: 
 β   β  F ormal Savings Account DummyY =  1 +  2 ε+   
Model 2: 
+ β   β  F ormal Savings Account Dummy F ood Secure in 2008 Y =  1 +  2 + β3  
 Crop Income 2010  T obacco Grower 2010 β  Household Sizeβ4 + β  T otal V alue of  Assets 2010 β5 +  6 +  7
+ ε   
 The third and fourth model regress the outcome variables on the information intervention 
assignment, with the same distance and literacy restriction. The third features no controls while 
the fourth features the controls. Models 3 and 4 are estimated in Tables 7,8, and 9. 
Model 3: 
  β   β  Information T reatmentY =  1 +  2 ε+   
Model 4: 
+ β   β  Information T reatment F ood Secure in 2008Y =  1 +  2 + β3  
 Crop Income 2010  T obacco Grower 2010 β  Household Sizeβ4 + β  T otal V alue of  Assets 2010 β5 +  6 +  7
+ ε   
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The fifth and sixth model regress the outcome variables, instrumenting the information 
intervention assignment for ‘Any Formal Savings Account.” The fifth model features no controls 
while the sixth features controls. Models 5 and 6 are estimated in Tables 10, 11, and 12.  
Model 5: 
   β   β  AnyActY =  1 +  2
︿
ε+   
Model 6:  
+  β   β  AnyAct  F ood Secure 2008  Y =  1 +  2
︿
+ β3  Crop Income 2010 β4 +
 T obacco Grower 2010 β  Household Sizeβ  T otal V alue of  Assets 2010 β5 +  6 +  7 + ε   
*​Where​ AnyAct ​= Any Formal Savings Account Dummy  
Where​ Y = ​Quantity/amount of remittance and payment Service Transactions, as well as 
indicators for any remittance sent/received or payment service used  
Results 
Table 4: Impact of Savings on Remittances Received (OLS)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Quantity  Quantity  Amount (Kwacha) Amount (Kwacha) Any  Any  
Any Individual Has 
Account 
1.098** 
(0.440) 
1.111** 
(0.510) 
7,669** 
(3,295) 
7,657** 
(3,584) 
0.161*** 
(0.0408) 
0.141*** 
(0.0446) 
Food Secure   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
0.111 
(0.319) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
106.3 
(2,004) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
0.108 
(0.0683)   
Crop Income, 2010 5.07e-07 
(1.30e-06) 
0.00206 
(0.00984) 
3.19e-08 
(1.82e-07)   
Total Value of 
Assets, 2010 
6.00e-06 
(1.24e-05) 
0.0642 
(0.0991) 
7.45e-07 
(2.37e-06) 
Tobacco Grower, 
2010 
-0.494* 
(0.261) 
-2,158 
(2,401) 
-0.108** 
(0.0426) 
Household Size, 
2008 
-0.0206 
(0.0988) 
115.7 
(892.2) 
0.0103 
(0.00943) 
Constant 0.249*** 
(0.0569) 
0.492 
(0.498) 
1,049** 
(478.4) 
1,028 
(4,193) 
0.108*** 
(0.0158) 
0.0991* 
(0.0528)   
Observations 540 434 540 434 540 434 
R-squared 0.038 0.045 0.030 0.034 0.036 0.058 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4 displays the results of the uncontrolled and controlled OLS regressions (Models 1 
& 2)  involving the indicator for an individual being an account holder and remittance received 
behavior.  These regression results estimate the effect of an individual having a savings account 
on the frequency (Quantity) and monetary value (Amount) of remittances received within the 
sampling period as well as the likelihood that a household will receive any remittance.  These 
regression models are likely to contain endogeneity, as previously discussed, and thus the 
estimations are not completely representative of the true relationships between savings and 
remittances received.  
Having a savings account is estimated to have a significant relationship with quantity 
(p=0.014 for uncontrolled and p=0.032 for controlled) and amount (p=0.022 for uncontrolled and 
p=0.035 for controlled) of remittances received at the 95% confidence level.  Furthermore, 
having a savings account is estimated to have a significant relationship with the likelihood 
(P-0.000 for uncontrolled and P-0.002 for controlled) to receive any remittance at the 99% 
confidence level.  These results suggest a positive relationship between an individual having a 
savings account and the receiving of remittances.  The results estimate that, on average, an 
individual without a savings account is likely to receive 0.25 remittances while an individual 
with an account is likely to receive 1.35 remittances.  This is a difference of 1.10 remittances. 
However, endogeneity is likely present, which affects the accuracy of these results.  The results 
estimate an even larger increase in the total value of remittances received in those with an 
account over those without. The OLS regression models estimate account holders to receive 
7,657-7,669 Kwacha (roughly $55) more than those without accounts. Since those without 
accounts were estimated to receive 1,049 Kwacha (Roughly $7), this amounts to a 731% increase 
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in remittances received when an individual has a formal savings account.  The last two columns 
within Table 4 relate to the indicator variable representing whether a household received any 
remittances. These results suggest that 10.8% of those without a formal savings account receive a 
remittance versus 26.9% for those with a formal savings account. This suggests that those with a 
formal savings account are 149% more likely to receive a remittance than those without an 
account.  
The reduced form regression serves to leverage the information treatment to isolate and 
remove endogeneity that exists in the OLS regression regarding savings account ownership.  The 
information treatment is an independent driver of savings account uptake.  The only effect of the 
information treatment is an increase in savings account uptake, which allows it to be used as an 
instrument to remove the endogeneity present in the regression. As shown in Table 3, the 
information treatment had a significant relationship (at the 99% confidence level) with a rise in 
savings account uptake of up to 131%. 
Table 5: Reduced Form Effects of Information Treatment on Remittances Received (OLS) 
  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Quantity  
(2) 
Quantity  
(3) 
Amount (Kwacha) 
(4) 
Amount (Kwacha) 
(5) 
Any  
(6) 
Any  
Information 
Treatment 
0.245 
(0.217) 
0.240 
(0.270) 
1,374 
(1,637) 
1,285 
(1,784) 
0.0793** 
(0.0356) 
0.0743 
(0.0457) 
Food Secure   0.136 
(0.308) 
  314.4 
(1,872) 
  0.107 
(0.0672) 
Crop Income, 
2010 
  1.28e-06 
(1.21e-06) 
  0.00739 
(0.00895) 
  1.28e-07 
(1.79e-07) 
Total Value of 
Assets, 2010 
  7.99e-06 
(1.38e-05) 
  0.0780 
(0.108) 
  9.90e-07 
(2.53e-06) 
Tobacco Grower, 
2010 
  -0.443* 
(0.251) 
  -1,847 
(2,250) 
  -0.0974** 
(0.0435) 
Household Size, 
2008 
  -0.000488 
(0.102) 
  264.4 
(921.9) 
  0.0117 
(0.00988) 
Constant 0.352*** 
(0.130) 
0.425 
(0.514) 
1,944* 
(995.0) 
717.5 
(4,486) 
0.1000*** 
(0.0233) 
0.0726 
(0.0561) 
Observations 540 434 540 434 540 434 
R-squared 0.003 0.015 0.001 0.010 0.013 0.044 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5 displays the reduced form effect regressions for remittances received.  The results 
show no significance with quantity (p=0.403 for uncontrolled and p=0.473 for controlled) and 
amount (p=0.262 for uncontrolled and p=0.377 for controlled).  The only significance that is 
found, which is at the 95% confidence level, is with the indicator representing any remittance 
received (p=0.028 for uncontrolled and p=0.107 for controlled).  This implies that endogeneity 
(likely omitted variable bias and reverse causality) existed with the quantity and amount of 
remittances received that caused the significant relationship in the previous OLS regression. 
This follows logically because: the fact that a person has a savings account has likely little to no 
effect on their relatives’ financial capacity to send more valuable and more frequent remittances. 
The fact that there is significance with the indicator representing any remittance received also 
follows logically: the savings account allows a person the ability to receive a remittance.  In 
summation, having a savings account is likely to increase the chances a person receives a 
remittance, but likely does not cause them to receive more money more often.  
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Table 6: Impact of Savings on Remittances Received (IV-2SLS) 
  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Quantity  
(2) 
Quantity  
(3) 
Amount (Kwacha) 
(4) 
Amount (Kwacha) 
(5) 
Any  
(6) 
Any  
Any Individual Has 
Account 
1.413 
(1.219) 
1.366 
(1.472) 
7,937 
(9,193) 
7,322 
(9,717) 
0.458** 
(0.217) 
0.424* 
(0.256) 
Food Secure   
  
  
  
  
  
  
0.1000 
(0.315) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
121.4 
(1,954) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
0.0954 
(0.0695) 
Crop Income, 2010 3.28e-07 
(1.55e-06) 
0.00230 
(0.0118) 
-1.67e-07 
(2.54e-07) 
Total Value of 
Assets, 2010 
5.54e-06 
(1.24e-05) 
0.0648 
(0.0985) 
2.29e-07 
(1.90e-06) 
Tobacco Grower, 
2010 
-0.500* 
(0.267) 
-2,150 
(2,485) 
-0.115** 
(0.0461) 
Household Size, 
2008 
-0.0267 
(0.103) 
123.7 
(846.4) 
0.00351 
(0.0117) 
Constant 0.182 
(0.240) 
0.484 
(0.493) 
991.5 
(1,859) 
1,037 
(4,211) 
0.0450 
(0.0443) 
0.0911* 
(0.0524) 
Observations 540 434 540 434 540 434 
R-squared 0.035 0.044 0.030 0.034     
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 6 displays the IV-2SLS regression results involving remittance received variables 
utilizing the information treatment as an instrument to remove endogeneity.   As with the 
reduced form regression, an individual having a savings account did not have a significant 
relationship with quantity (p=0.247 for uncontrolled and p=0.353 for controlled) or amount 
(p=0.388 for uncontrolled and p=-0.451 for controlled) of remittances received.  This follows 
from the logic explained in the previous section: the financial capacity of a household’s relatives 
will not grow because of the fact that the receiver now has a bank account. Endogeneity could 
have existed in the form of omitted variable bias and reverse causality.  A potential omitted 
variable could be the level of education of a household.  For example, a household with higher 
levels of education is likely to open an account and potentially have more connections with 
successful relatives that allow them to receive larger remittances.  Reverse causality is also a 
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likely form of endogeneity because a household that receives larger and more frequent 
remittances might be more inclined to open an account and receive those remittances through a 
formal account.  
The regression results do estimate a significant positive relationship between having a 
formal savings account and the likelihood that a household will receive any remittance (p=-0.035 
for uncontrolled and p=0.097 for controlled). The estimated magnitude of the effect of a savings 
account is also very large.  Those without formal accounts are 4.5% likely to receive a remittance 
while those with an account are 50.3%-51.51% likely to receive a remittance.  This means that 
those with an account are roughly 11 times more likely to receive a remittance.  Given 
remittances are often a key lifeline and source of means for Sub-Saharan Africans, this means 
that increasing formal account uptake could be a key factor in providing financial relief to more 
remote Sub-Saharan Africans.  
Table 7: Impact of Savings on Remittances Sent (OLS) 
  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Quantity  
(2) 
Quantity  
(3) 
Amount (Kwacha) 
(4) 
Amount (Kwacha) 
(5) 
Any  
(6) 
Any  
Any Individual Has 
Account 
0.621 
(0.379) 
0.614 
(0.423) 
3,906* 
(2,338) 
3,366 
(2,577) 
0.144*** 
(0.0392) 
0.0897** 
(0.0424) 
Food Secure   0.885 
(0.818) 
  4,629 
(3,745) 
  0.146** 
(0.0609) 
Crop Income, 2010   -1.39e-06 
(1.48e-06) 
  -0.00245 
(0.00806) 
  2.72e-07 
(1.74e-07) 
Total Value of 
Assets, 2010 
  1.27e-07 
(6.44e-06) 
  0.0141 
(0.0933) 
  -2.63e-06* 
(1.50e-06) 
Tobacco Grower, 
2010 
  -0.204 
(0.127) 
  -1,045 
(1,245) 
  -0.0110 
(0.0332) 
Household Size, 
2008 
  0.109 
(0.0695) 
  912.5 
(662.2) 
  0.00852 
(0.00939) 
Constant 0.113*** 
(0.0338) 
-0.321 
(0.280) 
404.2 
(244.4) 
-4,108 
(2,755) 
0.0673*** 
(0.0143) 
0.0159 
(0.0488) 
Observations 525 419 525 419 525 419 
R-squared 0.018 0.046 0.017 0.046 0.039 0.059 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7 displays the results of the uncontrolled and controlled OLS regressions involving 
individual account ownership and remittances sent. Whether a household has an individual 
savings account or not is not a significant predictor of the quantity of remittances sent (p=0.104 
for uncontrolled and p=0.151 for controlled).  Account ownership was also insignificant in 
relation to the total value of remittances sent in the controlled regression(p=0.195), however it 
was significant at the 90% confidence level in the uncontrolled OLS regression (p=0.098).  The 
indicator for any remittance sent was significant at the 99% and the 95% confidence level 
respectively (p=0.000 for uncontrolled and p=0.37 for controlled).  
The significance in sending any remittance, and the lack thereof in quantity and amount, 
can be explained logically. Remittances sent from these households are from households that can 
afford to send money to relatives in other parts of the country or the continent.  The financial 
capacity to send remittances is likely not to be affected as much by a person taking up a savings 
account. However, the opportunity and ease of sending a remittance could potentially be 
improved by taking up a savings account. This could be an explanation for the difference in 
significance in these behaviors. The uncontrolled regression suggests that, on average, account 
owners see a 3,906 Kwacha ($27.90) increase in the amount of remittances sent over those 
without, who send 404.2 Kwacha ($2.89) on average. The OLS regressions also suggest that, on 
average, those without a formal savings account have a likelihood of sending a remittance of 
6.73% versus 10.56%-21.13% for account holders, or a 56.9%-214% increase in likelihood  
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Table 8 : Reduced Form Effects of Information Treatment on Remittances Sent (OLS) 
  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Quantity  
(2) 
Quantity  
(3) 
Amount (Kwacha) 
(4) 
Amount (Kwacha) 
(5) 
Any  
(6) 
Any  
Information 
Treatment 
0.222 
(0.164) 
0.190 
(0.155) 
1,888* 
(1,001) 
1,756* 
(930.2) 
0.0542** 
(0.0273) 
0.0587* 
(0.0331) 
Food Secure   0.928 
(0.854) 
  4,799 
(3,744) 
  0.149** 
(0.0633) 
Crop Income, 2010   -9.01e-07 
(1.15e-06) 
  0.000229 
(0.00614) 
  3.44e-07** 
(1.66e-07) 
Total Value of 
Assets, 2010 
  1.78e-07 
(6.56e-06) 
  0.0140 
(0.0942) 
  -2.63e-06* 
(1.48e-06) 
Tobacco Grower, 
2010 
  -0.164 
(0.111) 
  -776.2 
(1,131) 
  -0.00301 
(0.0338) 
Household Size, 
2008 
  0.114 
(0.0735) 
  917.6 
(685.1) 
  0.00832 
(0.00955) 
Constant 0.125** 
(0.0504) 
-0.366 
(0.314) 
219.4** 
(86.39) 
-4,631 
(2,995) 
0.0685*** 
(0.0191) 
-0.00268 
(0.0498) 
Observations 525 419 525 419 525 419 
R-squared 0.003 0.034 0.006 0.039 0.008 0.054 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Table 8 displays the reduced form regressions involving remittance sent behavior.  Again, 
quantity was insignificant(p=0.176 for uncontrolled and p=0.222 for controlled), while amount 
was significant at the 90% confidence level(p=0.062 for uncontrolled and p=0.071 for 
controlled).  A potential explanation for this result could be that a person has a higher capacity to 
save money with a savings account leading them to be capable of sending larger remittances 
when they send them.  However, there could be barriers to the number of times someone sends a 
remittance such as: proximity to the nearest place to send a remittance or a one time remittance 
fee that creates an incentive to send a fewer number of remittances.  The indicator for any 
remittance sent was significant at the 95% and 90% level (p=0.032 for uncontrolled and p=0.068 
for controlled). This means that there is likely a relationship between having a formal savings 
account and one’s likelihood to send a remittance.  It makes sense that when controlling for 
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income factors the relationship becomes less significant because those with higher amounts of 
wealth are more likely to send remittances regardless of account ownership status given they 
have higher financial capacity. 
Table 9: Impact of Savings on Remittances Sent (IV-2SLS) 
  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Quantity  
(2) 
Quantity  
(3) 
Amount (Kwacha) 
(4) 
Amount (Kwacha) 
(5) 
Any  
(6) 
Any  
Any Individual 
Has Account 
1.234 
(0.912) 
1.003 
(0.821) 
10,514* 
(5,645) 
9,258* 
(5,121) 
0.302** 
(0.141) 
0.310* 
(0.170) 
Food Secure   0.847 
(0.778) 
  4,048 
(3,504) 
  0.124** 
(0.0593) 
Crop Income, 
2010 
  -1.69e-06 
(1.72e-06) 
  -0.00705 
(0.00905) 
  1.01e-07 
(2.41e-07) 
Total Value of 
Assets, 2010 
  3.60e-08 
(6.47e-06) 
  0.0127 
(0.0900) 
  -2.68e-06** 
(1.28e-06) 
Tobacco 
Grower, 2010 
  -0.221 
(0.138) 
  -1,297 
(1,242) 
  -0.0204 
(0.0344) 
Household Size, 
2008 
  0.103 
(0.0650) 
  815.6 
(623.9) 
  0.00490 
(0.0102) 
Constant -0.0144 
(0.134) 
-0.340 
(0.287) 
-967.8 
(742.7) 
-4,389 
(2,789) 
0.0345 
(0.0331) 
0.00543 
(0.0515) 
Observations 525 419 525 419 525 419 
R-squared 0.000 0.041   0.014     
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 9 displays the IV-2SLS regression results involving remittances sent.  I find that 
having a savings account does not significantly affect the number of remittances a household 
sends(p=0.176 for uncontrolled and p=0.222 for controlled).  The quantity of remittances sent 
was very low throughout the sample, as only 4.8% of the sample (95 of 1,962) sent at least one 
remittance. The capacity to send a remittance means that a household is more privileged than 
most in their community.  I also find that having a savings account does have a significant effect 
on monetary value of remittances sent (p=0.062 for uncontrolled and p=0.071 for controlled) and 
whether or not a household is likely to send a remittance(p=0.032 for uncontrolled and p=0.068 
for controlled).   Of those without an account, an average of 3.5% are expected to send a 
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remittance while that same figure rises to 31.5%-33.7% for those with an account.  That is a 
roughly 875% rise in likelihood to send a remittance. This means that those who have the 
financial capacity to send a remittance are roughly 8 times more likely to do so if they have a 
formal savings account. Furthermore, those who do send remittances are likely to send larger 
amounts if they do have a bank account. On average, those without a bank account do not send 
any remittances while those that do have an account, on average, send between 4,869 and 9,546 
Kwacha ($34.78-$68.18).  In summation, remittances sent have a lot to do with a person’s 
economic status and wealth, but I find that having a bank account increases the likelihood that 
someone will send a remittance. 
Table 10: Impact of Savings on  Payment Services (OLS)   
  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Quantity 
(2) 
Quantity  
(3) 
Amount (Kwacha) 
(4) 
Amount (Kwacha) 
(5) 
Any  
(6) 
Any  
Any Individual 
Has Account 
0.529 
(0.461) 
-0.0991 
(0.751) 
43,132*** 
(13,322) 
21,115* 
(10,972) 
0.226*** 
(0.0562) 
0.119*** 
(0.0438) 
Food Secure   3.101 
(2.514) 
  15,848 
(18,250) 
  0.0256 
(0.0612) 
Crop Income, 
2010 
  3.54e-06 
(2.53e-06) 
  0.128* 
(0.0695) 
  2.19e-07 
(2.12e-07) 
Total Value of 
Assets, 2010 
  -2.29e-05 
(1.87e-05) 
  -0.628 
(0.409) 
  -1.34e-07 
(1.37e-06) 
Tobacco Grower, 
2010 
  -0.226 
(0.501) 
  31,476*** 
(7,267) 
  0.484*** 
(0.0481) 
Household Size, 
2008 
  0.0301 
(0.0608) 
  1,549 
(1,294) 
  0.00159 
(0.00882) 
Constant 0.680** 
(0.342) 
0.232 
(0.335) 
7,538*** 
(1,762) 
-18,495** 
(8,130) 
0.128*** 
(0.0232) 
-0.00565 
(0.0473) 
Observations 523 417 523 417 523 417 
R-squared 0.001 0.024 0.068 0.172 0.059 0.368 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 10 displays the results of the controlled and uncontrolled OLS regressions 
involving individual savings account uptake and use of payment services, such as receiving 
auction house payments.  The effect of account ownership is found to be insignificant for the 
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quantity of payment service transactions(p=0.254 for uncontrolled and p=0.895 for controlled), 
which follows logically.  Payment services are used to receive auction house payments, receive 
salary, or pay bills.  The frequency of these transactions does not change with account ownership 
(ie. bills have to be paid at the same frequency regardless of if you have a bank account). 
Theoretically, the amount of these transactions would remain fairly constant as well.  The 
difference in significance from uncontrolled to controlled in regards to amount (p=0.002 for 
uncontrolled and p=0.057 for controlled) can be explained by the fact that the relationship is 
heavily driven by whether or not a household grows tobacco. Whether or not someone grows 
tobacco is likely the driver in increased auction house payments and thus payment services use. 
When controlling for the indicator representing if someone grows tobacco, the effect of savings 
accounts were less significant on the amount of payment services transactions.  The regression 
results show that the indicator for whether a person grows tobacco (Malawi’s cash crop) had a 
significant relationship, at the 99% level (p=.000), with the amount of payment services 
transactions.  Of payment service transactions, 84% were auction house payments.  Of these 
auction house payments, 88% of them were made by tobacco growers as tobacco is the cash crop 
sold at auction houses. It is possible that having a savings account helps tobacco growers invest 
more in their crops and thus receive more at the auction house.  The regressions suggest a 
significant and positive relationship between formal savings account ownership and the indicator 
for whether or not a household used payment services at all(p=0.000 for uncontrolled and 
p=0.008 for controlled). This is important because the results suggest that those who grow 
tobacco can potentially participate more heavily in the tobacco economy and make more money 
as a result.  
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Table 11: Reduced Form Effects of Information Treatment on Payment Services Activity  (OLS) 
  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Quantity  
(2) 
Quantity  
(3) 
Amount (Kwacha) 
(4) 
Amount (Kwacha) 
(5) 
Any  
(6) 
Any  
Information 
Treatment 
0.558 
(0.516) 
0.501 
(0.504) 
588.2 
(6,575) 
-3,263 
(6,165) 
-0.0133 
(0.0491) 
0.00336 
(0.0366) 
Food Secure   3.040 
(2.427) 
  17,272 
(18,200) 
  0.0312 
(0.0610) 
Crop Income, 
2010 
  3.49e-06 
(2.23e-06) 
  0.145** 
(0.0708) 
  3.15e-07 
(2.09e-07) 
Total Value of 
Assets, 2010 
  -2.31e-05 
(1.80e-05) 
  -0.618 
(0.425) 
  -8.63e-08 
(1.37e-06) 
Tobacco Grower, 
2010 
  -0.193 
(0.501) 
  32,389*** 
(7,531) 
  0.491*** 
(0.0478) 
Household Size, 
2008 
  0.0126 
(0.0613) 
  2,002 
(1,357) 
  0.00346 
(0.00918) 
Constant 0.496*** 
(0.122) 
0.0364 
(0.292) 
16,298*** 
(4,995) 
-16,234* 
(8,370) 
0.183*** 
(0.0323) 
-0.00116 
(0.0519) 
Observations 523 417 523 417 523 417 
R-squared 0.002 0.025 0.000 0.156 0.000 0.353 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 11 displays the reduced form regressions involving payment services activity. 
Quantity (p=0.282 for uncontrolled and p=0.323 for controlled), Amount (p=0.929 for 
uncontrolled and p=0.598 for controlled) and the indicator for any payment service used 
(p=0.788 for uncontrolled and p=0.927 for controlled) all were found to be insignificantly 
affected by account ownership.  As expected, there was no significance within the payment 
services activity.  This is because there was a high level of endogeneity within payment services 
activity because tobacco growers make up such a large part of the payment services transactions. 
Whether or not you grow tobacco has a lot more to do with whether you will use the auction 
house (the bulk of payment services transactions) than whether you have a savings account.  
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Table 12: Impact of Savings on Payment Services (IV-2SLS) 
  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Quantity  
(2) 
Quantity  
(3) 
Amount (Kwacha) 
(4) 
Amount (Kwacha) 
(5) 
Any  
(6) 
Any  
Any Individual Has 
Account 
3.345 
(3.166) 
2.841 
(2.959) 
3,525 
(38,959) 
-18,504 
(35,704) 
-0.0794 
(0.296) 
0.0191 
(0.205) 
Food Secure   2.953 
(2.348) 
  17,842 
(17,638) 
  0.0307 
(0.0602) 
Crop Income, 2010   1.18e-06 
(2.98e-06) 
  0.160* 
(0.0891) 
  3.00e-07 
(2.78e-07) 
Total Value of 
Assets, 2010 
  -2.41e-05 
(1.81e-05) 
  -0.611 
(0.426) 
  -9.30e-08 
(1.34e-06) 
Tobacco Grower, 
2010 
  -0.388 
(0.689) 
  33,659*** 
(8,936) 
  0.490*** 
(0.0468) 
Household Size, 
2008 
  -0.0187 
(0.0750) 
  2,206 
(1,415) 
  0.00325 
(0.00921) 
Constant 0.0880 
(0.418) 
0.0892 
(0.290) 
15,868* 
(9,082) 
-16,577** 
(8,457) 
0.193*** 
(0.0625) 
-0.000806 
(0.0495) 
Observations 523 417 523 417 523 417 
R-squared     0.011 0.114   0.358 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 12 displays the IV regressions involving payment services behavior. When 
removing endogeneity, I find little significance between having a financial savings account and 
utilizing payment services.  The significance that I do find relates to whether or not a person 
grows tobacco.  Holding all else fixed, tobacco growers are roughly 5x more likely to use 
payment services than non tobacco growers.  This follows because the large majority of payment 
services were tobacco growers accepting auction house payments for tobacco sales.  Tobacco 
growers need to use the auction house to receive income, so whether or not one grows tobacco is 
a bigger driver for payment service utilization than bank account ownership.  
Conclusion 
Identifying and leveraging proven methods to increase remittances in SSA is a very key 
element to SSA’s economic development, with potential benefits trickling down to political 
institutions and societal elements such as improved education.  My analysis provides a unique 
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look into the effects of account ownership on remittances in SSA given I use data from an 
effective field experiment.  My analysis allows for a deeper understanding of this relationship 
beyond typically used survey data that can have less homogeneous samples.  Leveraging the 
information treatment in this Malawi field experiment, I find that increasing savings accounts in 
the region increases the likelihood that a household will both receive and send a remittance.  The 
estimated magnitude of the effects are very large, up to 10.18x more likely to receive a 
remittance and 8.75x more likely to send.  This means that bank expansion into more remote 
areas of SSA is critical in the stimulation of remittance activity and thus economic development 
of the region.  
Barriers exist to this expansion on the supply and the demand side of things.  On the 
supply side, banks expanding into rural parts of Africa might be very expensive and not very cost 
effective.  On the demand side, barriers such as education and mistrust for banks can prevent 
Sub-Saharans from engaging in formal finance.  The same regression models I ran in my analysis 
were run when the data were restricted to the non-english-literate portion of the sample and there 
was no significance of having a bank account on any of the remittance or payment service 
transactions.  This means that information and financial inclusivity dispersion into these areas is 
far less likely to be effective when education levels are lower.  So education is likely to play a 
major role in the expansion of financial inclusivity and thus the expansion of remittances into the 
region.  
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Appendix A: Tangential Research 
Effects of Savings Account Uptake on Remittances in Non-English-Literate 
Tables 13-21 display regression results of regression results of the OLS, Reduced Form, 
and IV-2SLS regressions when restricting to the non-english-literate portion of the sample. I find 
no significance in the relationship between savings account uptake and remittances or payment 
services.  This means that the overwhelmingly positive effects of account ownership are muted 
to the point of insignificance in less educated people.  This is critical information because it 
reveals financial inclusivity’s limited effects when education levels are lower.  In order for 
account ownership to have a positive impact on remittances in SSA, education must be a heavily 
considered component.  Education levels rising will augment the effects of account ownership on 
remittances.  
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Effects of Savings Account Uptake on Form of Remittance 
A tangential hypothesis I explored but did not include in my main analysis was the effect 
of account ownership on what forms of remittance was sent or received, either from non-bank 
(typically cash) or formal bank remittance.  As SSA is a very cash heavy society, a lot of 
remittances are still handled in cash.  However, there are many drawbacks of cash remittances: 
sending cash over a long journey is risky as it can get lost or stolen.  Increasing formal bank 
remittances has the benefit of allowing the receiver to more easily receive and save the 
remittance.  I was curious to see what effects, if any, account ownership had on what form of 
remittance was sent or received.  
Tables 22-27 display the regression results of savings account uptake on indicators for 
the different forms/types of remittances.  Tables 24 and 27 display the results of the IV-2SLS 
regressions. I find a significant relationship, at the 90% confidence level,  with account 
ownership and the sending and receiving of formal bank remittances.  This means that increasing 
account ownership increases the use of formal bank remittances to send or receive a remittance. 
Receiving or sending a remittance from a formal bank allows a household to leverage the 
benefits of a formal bank account in the remittance process.  Monies can be more easily saved 
when receiving a remittance directly to a bank account and a household can potentially accrue 
interest when using a formal bank account.  
I also analyzed the effects of account ownership on the indicator for whether a received 
remittance was from an international or domestic relative.  Receiving international remittances 
can potentially offer more benefits as those who have had the ability to migrate to a different 
country often have access to higher paying jobs.  I was curious to see if account ownership 
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would have a significant effect on the receiving of international remittances.  As can be seen in 
table 24, I find no significant relationship between account ownership and the receiving of an 
international remittance.  
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Appendix B: Other Tables 
Table 13: Impact of Savings on  Remittances Received (OLS) - Non Literate  
  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Quantity 
(2) 
Quantity 
(3) 
Amount 
(4) 
Amount 
(5) 
Any 
(6) 
Any 
Any Individual Has 
Account 
0.196 
(0.122) 
0.0950 
(0.153) 
615.0* 
(350.4) 
191.7 
(349.3) 
0.0918*** 
(0.0334) 
0.0334 
(0.0349) 
Food Secure   -0.0357 
(0.0386) 
  298.8 
(383.4) 
  0.00855 
(0.0266) 
Crop Income, 2010   1.71e-07 
(1.95e-07) 
  0.000992 
(0.00130) 
  7.12e-08 
(9.57e-08) 
Total Value of 
Assets, 2010 
  9.95e-06** 
(4.78e-06) 
  0.0455 
(0.0285) 
  9.46e-06** 
(4.52e-06) 
Tobacco Grower, 
2010 
  0.0385 
(0.0597) 
  182.1 
(223.5) 
  0.0302* 
(0.0161) 
Household Size, 
2008 
  0.00700 
(0.00733) 
  54.66 
(36.60) 
  0.00127 
(0.00301) 
Constant 0.0442*** 
(0.0140) 
-0.0120 
(0.0381) 
96.42** 
(39.52) 
-332.0* 
(177.5) 
0.0221*** 
(0.00463) 
-0.00465 
(0.0167) 
Observations 1,346 1,064 1,346 1,064 1,346 1,064 
R-squared 0.007 0.011 0.009 0.030 0.017 0.056 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 14: Reduced Form Effects of Information Treatment on Remittances Received (OLS) 
  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Quantity 
(2) 
Quantity 
(3) 
Amount 
(4) 
Amount 
(5) 
Any 
(6) 
Any 
Information 
Treatment 
0.0516 
(0.0527) 
0.0692 
(0.0668) 
83.51 
(223.7) 
75.56 
(280.0) 
0.0187 
(0.0191) 
0.0252 
(0.0238) 
Food Secure   -0.0532 
(0.0955) 
  -60.44 
(428.9) 
  -0.0119 
(0.0436) 
Crop Income, 2010   5.51e-08 
(2.68e-07) 
  0.000427 
(0.00133) 
  -1.83e-08 
(6.70e-08) 
Total Value of 
Assets, 2010 
  7.46e-06 
(8.69e-06) 
  0.0575 
(0.0434) 
  2.00e-06 
(2.69e-06) 
Tobacco Grower, 
2010 
  -0.0616 
(0.0620) 
  -286.1 
(328.0) 
  -0.00608 
(0.0242) 
Household Size, 
2008 
  -0.00991 
(0.0146) 
  89.66 
(79.39) 
  -0.000697 
(0.00515) 
        
Constant 0.130*** 
(0.0368) 
0.208** 
(0.0926) 
524.2*** 
(152.8) 
160.8 
(450.1) 
0.0618*** 
(0.0123) 
0.0775** 
(0.0319) 
Observations 1,365 1,084 1,365 1,084 1,365 1,084 
R-squared 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.003 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 15: Impact of Savings on  Remittances Received (IV-2SLS) - Non Literate  
  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Quantity 
(2) 
Quantity 
(3) 
Amount 
(4) 
Amount 
(5) 
Any 
(6) 
Any 
Any Individual Has 
Account 
2.008 
(2.429) 
2.608 
(2.924) 
3,251 
(8,705) 
2,846 
(10,311) 
0.728 
(0.867) 
0.950 
(1.047) 
Food Secure   -0.252 
(0.255) 
  -277.1 
(926.0) 
  -0.0842 
(0.0988) 
Crop Income, 2010   -1.62e-06 
(1.90e-06) 
  -0.00141 
(0.00708) 
  -6.30e-07 
(6.77e-07) 
Total Value of Assets, 
2010 
  -2.04e-05 
(3.53e-05) 
  0.0271 
(0.109) 
  -8.17e-06 
(1.25e-05) 
Tobacco Grower, 
2010 
  -0.303 
(0.262) 
  -549.5 
(950.7) 
  -0.0940 
(0.0947) 
Household Size, 2008   -0.0280 
(0.0288) 
  69.88 
(93.56) 
  -0.00730 
(0.00929) 
Constant 0.0332 
(0.147) 
0.379** 
(0.193) 
366.9 
(534.1) 
347.4 
(590.3) 
0.0266 
(0.0511) 
0.140** 
(0.0625) 
Observations 1,365 1,084 1,365 1,084 1,365 1,084 
R-squared       0.006     
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 16: Impact of Savings on  Remittances Sent (OLS) - Non Literate  
  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Quantity 
(2) 
Quantity 
(3) 
Amount 
(4) 
Amount 
(5) 
Any 
(6) 
Any 
Any Individual Has 
Account 
0.187 
(0.134) 
0.228 
(0.158) 
1,373 
(852.0) 
1,461 
(1,064) 
0.0549 
(0.0397) 
0.0605 
(0.0473) 
Food Secure   -0.0734 
(0.0872) 
  -173.3 
(413.9) 
  -0.0176 
(0.0422) 
Crop Income, 2010   -8.60e-08 
(2.95e-07) 
  -0.000511 
(0.00158) 
  -5.51e-08 
(7.09e-08) 
Total Value of 
Assets, 2010 
  5.50e-06 
(7.83e-06) 
  0.0421 
(0.0383) 
  1.53e-06 
(2.50e-06) 
Tobacco Grower, 
2010 
  -0.0882 
(0.0580) 
  -424.6 
(301.4) 
  -0.0137 
(0.0245) 
Household Size, 
2008 
  -0.0109 
(0.0147) 
  79.86 
(81.45) 
  -0.000885 
(0.00521) 
Constant 0.143*** 
(0.0259) 
0.250*** 
(0.0899) 
479.7*** 
(103.7) 
271.8 
(415.0) 
0.0670*** 
(0.00899) 
0.0912*** 
(0.0295) 
Observations 1,365 1,084 1,365 1,084 1,365 1,084 
R-squared 0.003 0.006 0.009 0.014 0.003 0.003 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 17: Reduced Form Effects of Information Treatment on Remittances Sent (OLS) 
  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Quantity 
(2) 
Quantity 
(3) 
Amount 
(4) 
Amount 
(5) 
Any 
(6) 
Any 
Information Treatment 0.0272 
(0.0343) 
0.0312 
(0.0421) 
-19.29 
(81.33) 
-42.90 
(99.73) 
0.00678 
(0.0104) 
0.00292 
(0.0116) 
Food Secure   -0.0305 
(0.0353) 
  306.9 
(395.1) 
  0.0102 
(0.0266) 
Crop Income, 2010   2.28e-07 
(1.81e-07) 
  0.00112 
(0.00146) 
  9.20e-08 
(1.00e-07) 
Total Value of Assets, 
2010 
  1.09e-05* 
(5.59e-06) 
  0.0479* 
(0.0281) 
  9.83e-06** 
(4.53e-06) 
Tobacco Grower, 2010   0.0487 
(0.0521) 
  194.0 
(200.3) 
  0.0332** 
(0.0155) 
Household Size, 2008   0.00757 
(0.00709) 
  56.78 
(35.04) 
  0.00155 
(0.00301) 
Constant 0.0434*** 
(0.0154) 
-0.0309 
(0.0449) 
141.2** 
(66.52) 
-326.3** 
(162.9) 
0.0244*** 
(0.00648) 
-0.00797 
(0.0167) 
Observations 1,346 1,064 1,346 1,064 1,346 1,064 
R-squared 0.001 0.010 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.054 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 18: Impact of Savings on Remittances Sent (IV-2SLS) - Non Literate  
  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Quantity 
(2) 
Quantity 
(3) 
Amount 
(4) 
Amount 
(5) 
Any 
(6) 
Any 
Any Individual Has 
Account 
0.979 
(1.218) 
1.034 
(1.412) 
-695.1 
(3,108) 
-1,419 
(3,561) 
0.244 
(0.360) 
0.0965 
(0.380) 
Food Secure   -0.0802 
(0.0896) 
  375.1 
(510.3) 
  0.00556 
(0.0321) 
Crop Income, 2010   -4.22e-07 
(8.36e-07) 
  0.00201 
(0.00258) 
  3.12e-08 
(2.52e-07) 
Total Value of Assets, 
2010 
  -7.92e-07 
(1.70e-05) 
  0.0640 
(0.0628) 
  8.74e-06 
(7.02e-06) 
Tobacco Grower, 2010   -0.0370 
(0.106) 
  311.7 
(392.6) 
  0.0252 
(0.0334) 
Household Size, 2008   -0.00141 
(0.0135) 
  69.11 
(51.52) 
  0.000707 
(0.00454) 
Constant -0.00177 
(0.0665) 
0.0472 
(0.0860) 
173.3 
(204.2) 
-433.6 
(317.8) 
0.0132 
(0.0208) 
-0.000669 
(0.0306) 
Observations 1,346 1,064 1,346 1,064 1,346 1,064 
R-squared           0.049 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 19: Impact of Savings on  Payment Services (OLS) - Non Literate  
  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Quantity 
(2) 
Quantity 
(3) 
Amount 
(4) 
Amount 
(5) 
Any 
(6) 
Any 
Any Individual Has 
Account 
1.131*** 
(0.255) 
0.385** 
(0.150) 
70,782*** 
(18,560) 
4,320 
(28,120) 
0.461*** 
(0.0653) 
0.220*** 
(0.0534) 
Food Secure   0.103 
(0.131) 
  -3,462 
(11,466) 
  0.0678** 
(0.0323) 
Crop Income, 2010   2.36e-06* 
(1.22e-06) 
  0.382 
(0.239) 
  2.75e-07** 
(1.23e-07) 
Total Value of Assets, 
2010 
  1.36e-05 
(1.29e-05) 
  1.420 
(1.741) 
  4.78e-06 
(3.27e-06) 
Tobacco Grower, 
2010 
  0.537*** 
(0.0754) 
  15,290** 
(5,968) 
  0.454*** 
(0.0403) 
Household Size, 2008   -0.0149** 
(0.00729) 
  -1,536 
(1,359) 
  0.00183 
(0.00438) 
Constant 0.130*** 
(0.0216) 
-0.0732 
(0.0534) 
5,586*** 
(1,872) 
-15,402** 
(7,149) 
0.0984*** 
(0.0144) 
-0.0299 
(0.0228) 
Observations 1,364 1,072 1,364 1,072 1,364 1,072 
R-squared 0.110 0.337 0.047 0.245 0.111 0.444 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 20: Reduced Form Effects of Information Treatment on Payment Services (OLS) 
  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Quantity 
(2) 
Quantity 
(3) 
Amount 
(4) 
Amount 
(5) 
Any 
(6) 
Any 
Information 
Treatment 
0.00709 
(0.0711) 
-0.0109 
(0.0449) 
2,353 
(5,185) 
-438.7 
(4,292) 
-0.00418 
(0.0352) 
0.00633 
(0.0189) 
Food Secure   0.122 
(0.135) 
  -3,252 
(12,568) 
  0.0793** 
(0.0336) 
Crop Income, 2010   2.62e-06** 
(1.23e-06) 
  0.385* 
(0.223) 
  4.24e-07*** 
(1.52e-07) 
Total Value of 
Assets, 2010 
  1.75e-05 
(1.43e-05) 
  1.466 
(1.678) 
  6.92e-06* 
(3.88e-06) 
Tobacco Grower, 
2010 
  0.570*** 
(0.0794) 
  15,640** 
(7,036) 
  0.474*** 
(0.0401) 
Household Size, 
2008 
  -0.0108 
(0.00768) 
  -1,487 
(1,631) 
  0.00407 
(0.00465) 
Constant 0.197*** 
(0.0397) 
-0.0961 
(0.0591) 
8,864*** 
(2,289) 
-15,528** 
(6,770) 
0.129*** 
(0.0230) 
-0.0482* 
(0.0282) 
Observations 1,365 1,072 1,365 1,072 1,365 1,072 
R-squared 0.000 0.322 0.000 0.245 0.000 0.422 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
42 
Table 21: Impact of Savings on Payment Services (IV-2SLS) - Non Literate  
  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Quantity 
(2) 
Quantity 
(3) 
Amount 
(4) 
Amount 
(5) 
Any 
(6) 
Any 
Any Individual Has 
Account 
0.289 
(2.673) 
-0.409 
(1.797) 
92,259 
(191,571) 
-16,459 
(160,744) 
-0.217 
(1.434) 
0.237 
(0.659) 
Food Secure   0.144 
(0.183) 
  -2,391 
(18,610) 
  0.0669 
(0.0430) 
Crop Income, 2010   2.90e-06 
(1.78e-06) 
  0.396** 
(0.176) 
  2.63e-07 
(4.50e-07) 
Total Value of Assets, 
2010 
  2.15e-05 
(2.31e-05) 
  1.626 
(2.274) 
  4.61e-06 
(7.66e-06) 
Tobacco Grower, 2010   0.607*** 
(0.187) 
  17,133 
(18,688) 
  0.453*** 
(0.0830) 
Household Size, 2008   -0.00664 
(0.0191) 
  -1,320 
(2,943) 
  0.00166 
(0.00728) 
Constant 0.182 
(0.158) 
-0.130 
(0.136) 
4,263 
(10,362) 
-16,882* 
(10,219) 
0.140 
(0.0891) 
-0.0287 
(0.0471) 
Observations 1,364 1,072 1,364 1,072 1,364 1,072 
R-squared 0.049 0.270 0.043 0.242   0.444 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 22: Impact of Savings on Type of Remittance Received Indicators (OLS)  
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Formal Bank 
(2) 
Formal Bank  
(3) 
Non-Bank  
(4) 
Non-Bank  
(5) 
Any International  
(6) 
Any International 
Any 
Individual 
Has Account 
0.112*** 
(0.0291) 
0.120*** 
(0.0302) 
0.0430 
(0.0362) 
0.0145 
(0.0420) 
0.0102 
(0.0143) 
0.000910 
(0.0164) 
Food Secure   0.0459 
(0.0332) 
  0.0653 
(0.0612) 
  0.0449 
(0.0349) 
Crop Income, 
2010 
  -1.87e-08 
(7.59e-08) 
  3.63e-08 
(1.64e-07) 
  1.80e-08 
(5.26e-08) 
Total Value 
of Assets, 
2010 
  3.23e-07 
(1.03e-06) 
  5.38e-07 
(2.19e-06) 
  -6.77e-07* 
(3.91e-07) 
Tobacco 
Grower, 2010 
  -0.0424** 
(0.0169) 
  -0.0624 
(0.0378) 
  -0.00971 
(0.0135) 
Household 
Size, 2008 
  0.00440 
(0.00579) 
  0.00624 
(0.00839) 
  0.00856** 
(0.00377) 
Constant 0.00588* 
(0.00344) 
-0.0101 
(0.0259) 
0.102*** 
(0.0157) 
0.107** 
(0.0489) 
0.0141** 
(0.00565) 
-0.0273* 
(0.0156) 
Observations 539 433 539 433 540 434 
R-squared 0.078 0.110 0.003 0.013 0.001 0.025 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 23: Reduced Form Effect of Information Treatment on Type of Remittance Received Indicators (OLS)  
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Formal Bank  
(2) 
Formal Bank  
(3) 
Non-Bank  
(4) 
Non-Bank  
(5) 
Any International  
(6) 
Any International 
Information 
Treatment 
0.0253* 
(0.0152) 
0.0182 
(0.0176) 
0.0512 
(0.0318) 
0.0529 
(0.0398) 
-0.0129 
(0.0118) 
-0.0225 
(0.0156) 
Food Secure   0.0496 
(0.0335) 
  0.0603 
(0.0609) 
  0.0473 
(0.0347) 
Crop Income, 
2010 
  6.26e-08 
(7.43e-08) 
  4.44e-08 
(1.51e-07) 
  1.97e-08 
(4.85e-08) 
Total Value of 
Assets, 2010 
  5.49e-07 
(1.17e-06) 
  5.54e-07 
(2.15e-06) 
  -6.71e-07* 
(3.97e-07) 
Tobacco Grower, 
2010 
  -0.0374** 
(0.0165) 
  -0.0568 
(0.0382) 
  -0.0120 
(0.0134) 
Household Size, 
2008 
  0.00679 
(0.00636) 
  0.00517 
(0.00865) 
  0.00918** 
(0.00399) 
Constant 0.0160* 
(0.00921) 
-0.0145 
(0.0300) 
0.0840*** 
(0.0212) 
0.0860* 
(0.0500) 
0.0232** 
(0.0103) 
-0.0181 
(0.0149) 
Observations 539 433 539 433 540 434 
R-squared 0.006 0.035 0.007 0.019 0.003 0.031 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 24: Impact of Savings on Type of Remittance Received Indicators (IV-2SLS)  
  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Formal Bank 
(2) 
Formal Bank  
(3) 
Non-Bank  
(4) 
Non-Bank  
(5) 
Any International  
(6) 
Any International  
Any Individual 
Has Account 
0.148* 
(0.0837) 
0.105 
(0.0918) 
0.300 
(0.200) 
0.306 
(0.238) 
-0.0743 
(0.0708) 
-0.128 
(0.101) 
Food Secure   0.0465 
(0.0320) 
  0.0514 
(0.0626) 
  0.0507 
(0.0356) 
Crop Income, 
2010 
  -8.97e-09 
(9.78e-08) 
  -1.64e-07 
(2.39e-07) 
  1.09e-07 
(8.91e-08) 
Total Value of 
Assets, 2010 
  3.50e-07 
(1.03e-06) 
  -2.37e-08 
(1.75e-06) 
  -4.41e-07 
(4.15e-07) 
Tobacco Grower, 
2010 
  -0.0421** 
(0.0172) 
  -0.0702* 
(0.0408) 
  -0.00665 
(0.0143) 
Household Size, 
2008 
  0.00474 
(0.00594) 
  -0.000790 
(0.0112) 
  0.0116** 
(0.00580) 
Constant -0.00177 
(0.0167) 
-0.00976 
(0.0262) 
0.0480 
(0.0411) 
0.0996** 
(0.0504) 
0.0321* 
(0.0188) 
-0.0237 
(0.0157) 
Observations 539 433 539 433 540 434 
R-squared 0.070 0.109         
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p​<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 25: Impact of Savings on Type of Remittance Sent Indicators (OLS)  
  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Formal Bank 
(2) 
Formal Bank  
(3) 
Non-Bank  
(4) 
Non-Bank  
Any Individual Has 
Account 
0.0825*** 
(0.0247) 
0.0477** 
(0.0203) 
0.0918** 
(0.0381) 
0.0674 
(0.0421) 
Food Secure   0.0913** 
(0.0413) 
  0.109* 
(0.0598) 
Crop Income, 2010   2.50e-07* 
(1.50e-07) 
  4.56e-08 
(1.34e-07) 
Total Value of Assets, 
2010 
  -1.16e-06 
(1.36e-06) 
  -1.86e-06** 
(8.74e-07) 
Tobacco Grower, 2010   -0.0290** 
(0.0127) 
  0.00852 
(0.0314) 
Household Size, 2008   0.0108 
(0.00727) 
  0.00103 
(0.00920) 
Constant 0.00257 
(0.00260) 
-0.0703** 
(0.0338) 
0.0651*** 
(0.0134) 
0.0671 
(0.0492) 
Observations 483 378 517 412 
R-squared 0.058 0.164 0.018 0.024 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 26: Reduced Form Effects of Information Treatment on Type of Remittance Sent Indicators (OLS)  
  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Formal Bank 
(2) 
Formal Bank  
(3) 
Non-Bank  
(4) 
Non-Bank  
Information Treatment 0.0194* 
(0.0110) 
0.0196* 
(0.0117) 
0.0423 
(0.0257) 
0.0482 
(0.0308) 
Food Secure   0.0914** 
(0.0419) 
  0.110* 
(0.0624) 
Crop Income, 2010   2.92e-07* 
(1.50e-07) 
  1.01e-07 
(1.24e-07) 
Total Value of Assets, 2010   -1.18e-06 
(1.39e-06) 
  -1.88e-06** 
(8.40e-07) 
Tobacco Grower, 2010   -0.0264** 
(0.0132) 
  0.0152 
(0.0318) 
Household Size, 2008   0.0110 
(0.00737) 
  0.000640 
(0.00919) 
Constant 0.00858 
(0.00600) 
-0.0757** 
(0.0336) 
0.0610*** 
(0.0172) 
0.0519 
(0.0512) 
Observations 483 378 517 412 
R-squared 0.005 0.151 0.006 0.022 
 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 27: Impact of Savings on Type of Remittance Sent Indicators (IV-2SLS)  
  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Formal Bank 
(2) 
Formal Bank  
(3) 
Non-Bank  
(4) 
Non-Bank  
Any Individual Has 
Account 
0.115* 
(0.0607) 
0.107* 
(0.0611) 
0.254* 
(0.145) 
0.267 
(0.165) 
Food Secure   0.0889** 
(0.0399) 
  0.0954* 
(0.0578) 
Crop Income, 2010   1.96e-07 
(1.41e-07) 
  -8.98e-08 
(2.09e-07) 
Total Value of Assets, 
2010 
  -1.14e-06 
(1.25e-06) 
  -1.94e-06** 
(9.81e-07) 
Tobacco Grower, 2010   -0.0296** 
(0.0125) 
  -0.00155 
(0.0331) 
Household Size, 2008   0.00991 
(0.00758) 
  -0.00238 
(0.00944) 
Constant -0.00377 
(0.0116) 
-0.0733** 
(0.0327) 
0.0331 
(0.0306) 
0.0570 
(0.0539) 
Observations 483 378 517 412 
R-squared 0.049 0.137     
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
